Unit - 3 ❑ Skill for Security of Women & Children

Structure

3.1 Objectives

Mission

❖ Follow-up the implementation of international convention and national Laws pertinent to women, children and Youth conduct research and study prepare policy and guidelines;

❖ Follow-up the implementation; collaborate with organization's working on women Youth issues and perform capacity building activities to ensure equal participation and benefit of women in political, economical and social spheres

Vision

To see the Ethiopian women and Youth Equal participation and to benefit from economic, social and political spheres and protect children's rights and security.

The Ministry of Women, Children and Youth Affairs shall have the power and duties to:

1. Create awareness and movement on the question of women, children and youth;

2. Collect, compile and disseminate to all stakeholders information on the objective realities faced by women, children and Youth;

3. Ensure that opportunities are created for women and the Youth to actively participate in political, economic and social affairs of the country;

4. Encourage and support women and the youth to be organized, based on their free will and needs, with a view to defending their rights and solving their problems;

5. Design strategies to follow up and evaluate the preparation of policies, legislations, development programs and projects by federal government organs to ensure that they give due considerations to women and youth issues;

6. Undertake studies to identify discriminatory practices, and follow up their implementation;

7. Device means for the proper application of women's right to affirmative actions guaranteed at the national level and follow the implementation of same;

8. Ensure that due attention is given to select women for decision-making positions in various government organs;

9. Coordinate all stakeholders to project the rights and well-being of children;

10. Follow up the implementation of treaties relating to women and children and submit reports to the concerned bodies.

3.2. Introduction

This Handbook describes some of the protection challenges faced by women and girls of concern to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and outlines various strategies we should adopt with our partners to tackle these challenges. It sets out the legal standards and principles that guide our work to protect women and girls and outlines the different roles and responsibilities of States and other actors. UNHCR's own responsibilities in this respect are explained, both as part of its mandate to secure international protection and durable solutions and as a United Nations (UN) agency. Suggestions for actions by UNHCR and partners to support women's and girls' enjoyment of their rights are also included. Examples of innovative practices from the field illustrate how these principles can be applied. This Handbook refers to the protection of women and girls with the understanding that we are referring to all women and girls of concern to UNHCR, namely women and girls who are:

❖ asylum-seekers,

❖ refugees,

❖ internally displaced,

❖ returnees,

❖ stateless, or

❖ who have integrated into new communities.

3.3 Skills for Ensuring Security of Women

General safety Skills

❖ The best way for a women to feel secured is to use common sense and to take self precautionary steps.

❖ The wisest thing for a woman to do is to avoid trouble by adjusting ones behaviour and to assess the prevailing environment and the associated risks involved.

❖ The woman must follow her own instinct.

❖ One must leave as soon as the place looks uncomfortabfe.

❖ The woman must keep her eyes, ears and instincts open *to* notice details about people so that it can be described if needed later on.

❖ The woman must always show self confidence and never display the feeling that she is unaware about that place or the place she is going.

❖ The woman must always get prior information about the area , such as the location of the nearest Police Station, nearby shops, restaurants and business centres and the location of the nearest telephone booth.

❖ A woman must always dress and behave conservatively.

❖ A woman must never wear jewellery or carry cash , keys etc. in order to attract robbers.

❖ A woman must always know about alternate routes to reach her destination

❖ Routine times for picking up children from school, going io office or time for shopping must be altered sometimes.

❖ The woman must avoid interfering during threatening situations such as pohticai rallies

❖ Woman must keep an eye on strangers who might assess a place before carrying out their actions.

❖ A woman must never feel shy to scream if the situation demands.

❖ The woman security must know how to operate the walkie-talkie system

❖ The woman security must know the local customs and the local language and signal for seeking help.

While alone at home

❖ While alone at home a woman must keep all the entry doors iocked.The entrance area shouid never be dark.

❖ Identify a place inside the house which can be considered most safe.

❖ There should be a fire exit if possible.

❖ A woman must never open a door to strangers.

❖ A woman must never allow a stranger to make a telephone call from the premises.

❖ While using a lift, a lone woman should avoid travel with a stranger and instead get off as soon as she feels uncomfortable

❖ A woman must never engage a servant without checking their precedents or without Police verification.

❖ Neighbours must be intimated about ail servants who have been dismissed from service.

❖ The woman must train her servants to never open door carelessly, never to give out phone number to strangers, never to discuss or tell family affairs that they may know with any outsider.

❖ A woman must intimate the security station officer about any suspicious activity she might sense.

While away from home or while travelling

❖ A woman must always keep her contact numbers with some confident person while she is away from home.

❖ A woman must always be alert while travelling.

❖ A photocopy of her tidcet, passport, driving licence, credit card must be kept back with someone before a woman leaves home.

While walking alone

❖ A woman must wear shoes that will not snap if she has to run.

❖ A woman must not walk alone at night.

❖ A woman must not take a dark, vacant or a road close to bushy surroundings where others can hide and attack.

❖ A woman must avoid talking to strangers.

❖ If a woman is followed by a stranger she must never hesitate to take such actions that she feels proper.

- ❖ A woman must never halt if a car approaches her with baa intentions. She must not hesitate to shout and scream.
- ❖ Women must never'hitch-hike or accept a ride from a stranger.
- ❖ A woman should never jiggle her keys while walking to teii others that she is preparing to use the keys, if a woman finds her residence door open or broken she s'nouid never enter but should summon heip from the neighbours or the police.
- ❖ A woman must carry her handbag in a secured manner to prevent snatching.

While using a Public transport

- ❖ A woman must wait at a designated area to catch a train or bus.
- ❖ A Woman must not travel in a deserted compartment A woman must preferably occupy a train compartment where the train conductor is present A woman should avoid standing in a deserted platform A woman should avoid catching the last train or the last bus.
- ❖ A woman should always stay alert and see if she is being followed *after* she slights from the tram or bus.
- ❖ A woman should try to have someone to meet her at the station or ʙᴜs stand if she returns late.

While socializing

- ❖ A woman should not socialize with any persons whom she does not know.
- ❖ A woman should try to go out with a group of persons.
- ❖ A woman snouid choose a place where mere are omer persons if she has to meet a unknown person.
- ❖ A woman snouid speak out her mind without ietong others to guess and approach her to have intimate relations.
- ❖ A woman must insist on being treated with respect.

Types of sexual harassment

- ❖ A man who is a stranger stares hard at a woman.
- ❖ A man may intentionally brush past a woman.
- ❖ A man may utter obscene words and disappear into the crowd
- ❖ A man may keep following a woman etc.

How to face such sexual harassment

- ❖ The woman must simple ignore the advance

- ❖ If required, the woman must return a harsh comment after ensuring that she is outside striking distance
- ❖ The woman can stop and challenge the man outright to make him embarrassed and tell him that he is wrong The woman may keep a diary recording the incidents with dates, incidents, remarks, comments .actual conversation etc. that can serve as a record for filing a rormai complaint afterwards.
- ❖ The woman may even record the comments / conversation in her mobile phone or any other instrument.
- ❖ The woman may seek help from other female colleagues or sympathetic co-workers.

3.4 Operating Skills for Providing Security for Children

- ❖ Introduction
- ❖ In most locations there are children who are present.
- ❖ The security as well as ail others persons concerned must make special efforts to protect the children especially during crisis.
- ❖ The dutv of the security would be to assist parents in considering what to do in a crisis situation for protecting their children.
- ❖ Rules for Children to Follow During Crisis
- ❖ The children must be taught not to go out of sight of their parents when playing in public places
- ❖ A child should be told not go anywhere with a stranger without parent's permission
- ❖ A child should be told never to accept packages or letters from strangers
- ❖ The child must carry some identity proof giving out his/her name, address and contact number
- ❖ Rules for Parents
- ❖ A child should be taught never to get into a car or go into a house without permission from the parent or a guardian
- ❖ A child should never be left unattended in a public place even for a few moments
- ❖ The child should be made to remember his/her home address and contact number
- ❖ Children must know how to use public telephone and must be made to remember a few emergency phone numbers
- ❖ The parents must be asked to leave their contact numbers where they can be reached if required.

- The children must be trained to never leave their main doors open or unlocked and also never to open a door to allow a stranger inside.

- A parent should always listen to a child who protests about a perscr, or feels uncomfortable with a person. The reason must be asked and probed since there could be genuine factors.

- The children should be taught about the dangers posed by matches, gasoline, stoves, deep water, electric plug points, standing on roof edges, stooping down from fcaVconies , playing near a well or riverside or sea shore etc.

- Teach the Children how to cope with Crisis

- The children must be taught about the types of disaster a community can face.

- The children should not be allowed to witness events like fighting, killing, carry dead bodies' crimes being committed etc.

- After a crisis the children should be asked to go to school if H is open or be engaged in playing activities in order to divert attention and help them to overcome the trauma and mental stress.

- During crisis, the children should never be neglected and left alone. The parents, the teachers , the friends and family members must collectively help the child to overcome the crisis and for that play groups and support groups may be formed.

- The parents must never express feelings of fear and grief in front of the children as in that case those children will never mature to boldly face any other crisis in future when they grew up themselves.

- In case a child has witnessed a crisis or has fallen ill, he/she must never be left alone but should be attended to and given proper counseling in order to overcome the after effects of the incident.

3.5 Operating Skills for Handling Natural & Nuclear Disasters

- Introduction
- Every individual must know what steps should be taken before, during and after a Natural and / or Nuclear disaster
- Nobody can predict when a disaster can take place or how severe the impact can be.
- Therefore the only way out is to be prepared for disaster and know how to respond during and alter the disaster.
- What to do — in General

- ❖ Keep a stock of eatables which required little cooking and no refrigeration because during a disaster there may not be power supply.
- ❖ Keep a spare gas cylinder along with some emergency cooking equipment.
- ❖ Keep a first-aid kit handy
- ❖ Keep some blankets ready
- ❖ Keep emergency spare clothing handy
- ❖ Keep torch lights, flashlights handly with fresh batteries etc.
- ❖ Keep a portable radio with spare batteries in order to hear announcements

Most of today's conflicts take place within states. Their root causes often include poverty, the struggle for scarce resources, and violations of human rights. They have another tragic feature in common: women and girls suffer their impact disproportionately. While women and girls endure the same trauma as the rest of the population — bombings, famines, epidemics, mass executions, torture, arbitrary imprisonment, forced migration, ethnic cleansing, threats and intimidation — they are also targets of specific forms of violence and abuse, including sexual violence and exploitation.

Efforts to resolve these conflicts and address their root causes will not succeed unless we empower all those who have suffered from them — including and especially women. And only if women play a full and equal part can we build the foundations for enduring peace — development, good governance, human rights and justice.

In conflict areas across the world, women's movements have worked with the United Nations to rebuild the structures of peace and security, to rehabilitate and reconcile societies, to protect refugees and the internally displaced, to educate and raise awareness of human rights and the rule of law. Within the Organization itself, the integration of gender perspectives in peace and security areas has become a central strategy. An Inter-agency Task Force on Women, Peace and Security has been established to address the role of women in peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and other activities.

This study, like the Inter-agency Task Force, is an initiative undertaken in response to Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security adopted in October 2000 - in which the Council underlined the vital role of women in conflict solution, and mandated a review of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building, and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution.

While the study shows that many positive steps have been taken to implement the resolution, women still form a minority of those who participate in peace and security negotiations, and receive less attention than men in post-conflict agreements, disarmament and reconstruction. Our challenge remains the full implementation of the landmark document that resolution 1325 represents. This study points the way to a more systematic way forward.

3.6 Standards and regulations

In order to ensure the effective and timely implementation of national or sub-national legislation and policies on shelters, relevant state ministers and departments should develop, in full collaboration with shelter workers and advocates, realistic guidelines, instructions and directives. Protocols and guidelines are important to outline the key service components provided by shelters and methods of service delivery, in order to promote women and girls' access to quality care and support.

Regulations for women's shelters can help to ensure that services to address the needs of women and their children are available, properly-resourced and appropriately aligned with core guiding principles.

Guidelines for shelter provision should be developed in collaboration with shelter staff as well as survivors, and may involve:

❖ The creation of a strategic plan for the shelter, which may answer the following questions: How will decisions be made? How will policies be developed? What is the state of the shelter and in what state should it be in the next three to five years? What is the process for achieving goals? (see developing a programme framework)

❖ A service delivery policy to include information such as the:

  ✪ shelter's mandate, principles;

  ✪ services offered to both women, and where relevant, children (including accommodation,/ provision of basic personal and household items, crisis intervention, risk assessment and safety planning, and counseling supports, referral and accompaniment to legal, health, security and social assistance, economic and employment activities);

  ✪ staffing and structure

  ✪ collection and storage of women's personal information (including rights related to access and confidentiality); and

  ✪ residents' rights and responsibilities.

For example, the Ixora shelter for abused women and their children, established in 1999 by Help *&* Shelter in Guyana, has developed a comprehensive *Governance, Policies & Procedures Manual* that is reviewed every 18 months. The manual covers guidelines related to the governance and operational aspects of the shelter as follows:

❖ **Help & Shelter Governance Structure** (including accountability measures, membership, meetings, role and responsibilities of the Board, roles of coordinator and volunteers)

❖ Finance (including budget Process and Responsibilities, audit Arrangements, delegated of Authority, accounting Policies and Procedures, among other areas)

❖ **Human Resources** (including employment Policy, Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures, Contracts for Services, voluntewer stipends)

❖ **Operations Procedures** (related to child protection, guidelines for personnel/volunteers, ethics and responsibilities, procedures for counseling, hotline support, sexual abuse cases. Monitoring and evaluation, physical and information security)

❖ The identification of minimum standards for what services will be available, how they will be distributed geographically and who will provide these services. These should include:

  ✪ Confidentiality

  ✪ Safety, security and respect for residents and staff

  ✪ Accessibility (including child care services)

  ✪ Availability

  ✪ Free of charge and provision for residents to stay as long as required, regardless of their financial situation

  ✪ Work within a gender analysis with the principles of empowerment and self-determination

  ✪ Expertise recognized and developed through training

  ✪ Qualified staff

  ✪ Holistic services

  ✪ Interagency coordination

Illustrative Example: **The Council of Europe's Combating Violence Against Women: Minimum Standards for Support Services includes the following set of minimum and asnirational standards for shelters.**	

Minimum standards	Aspirational standards
Services in shelters should be provided by female staff.	

Minimum standards	Aspirational standards
The security of residents should be addressed through confidential addresses and/or through appropriate security measures and monitoring.	There should be a written policy on visitors (where they are permitted). This should include ensuring that visitors understand confidentiality.
If there are insufficient places, or services are withdrawn - the shelter should assist in finding a suitable safe alternative accommodation.	Any alternative accommodation should be evaluated for compliance with the shelter's safety and confidentiality policies.
Refusal to provide or re-admit to services should only be undertaken where serious breaches of rules have taken place, or for safety of women and Children.	
Shelter support should be available for as long as the service user needs them.	
Staffing levels should be sufficient to meet the needs of current service users and children.	
Crisis support and safety planning for each service user.	Should provide information on the service user's rights and responsibilities (including confidentiality policies) within 24 hours of admission. Rules should be presented in empowering language.
A written needs assessment should be completed within 3 to 7 days of admission. This should encompass: health/medical needs; children; housing; legal options;	Specialist shelter provision should be made for women who are substance abusers.

Minimum standards	Aspirational standards
financial assistance and options; job training, employment, and education. Should be able to provide (or make referral to) legal advice, advocacy, accompaniment and other support services.	
Should provide assistance to ensure that service users have independent economic means when they leave the shelter.	
Should have at least one qualified child care worker on the staff. .	One child care worker per 10 children; Safe play areas; Outings and activities for children Child protection policy
Shelters should model and promote respect and non-violence in all interactions including those between adults and children.	
Where a place is unavailable due to the age of an accompanying male child. The shelter should assist in providing or finding an alternative safe place for the family.	Any alternative accommodation should be evaluated for compliance with the shelter's safety and confidentiality policies.
Should assist in maintaining the child's education.	Have protocol with local schools to address child residents' needs. Have space and facilities for adolescents to do homework.
Training for shelter volunteers and staff should be a minimum of 30 hours and cover: A gendered analysis of violence against women; Communication and intervention techniques;	There should be staff trained/able to communicate in sign language. Information and counseling should be available in several languages reflecting the communities the shelter provides services to.

Minimum standards	Aspirational standards
Confidentiality; Child protection; Accessing translation and disability services; How to make appropriate referrals; Information on trauma, coping and survival; Assessing risk; Non-discrimination and diversity; Empowerment.	[Staff should receive some basic training on immigration status/law.
Resettlement and follow-up services should be available to ex-residents and their children.	
Excerpt: Council of Europe. 2008 Combating Violence Against Women: Minimum Standards for Support Services. CoE. Vienna.	

Illustrative example: Establishing Service Standards in Scotland

From 2009-2011. Scottish Women's Aid, a network of 38 shelters, developed domestic violence servicestandards in response to the need for benchmarks and a framework for measuring the value of shelter specialist services. Using a collaborative assessment process, the standards aim to assist shelters to document their practices to create evidence and demonstrate their contributions to women. The Standards focus on 5 themes: staff skills; accessible services for children and young people; safety and security; effective partnerships; and representation of women's voices to other agencies. An assessment of 28 shelters in 2012 and an evaluation of the standards informed their finalization for use by members of the network.

Background

The assessment process began in 2009, with a draft set of standards shared with advocates at an annual shelter conference. This was followed by:

❖ The establishment of a working group with respresentatives from 11 shelters responsible for shaping the standards and developing criteria for each (completed in March 2011).

❖ Two trainings with shelter staff to: increase their skills and confidence as peer

assessors; outline the assessment process and approach, including asking questions and collating evidence; review challenges/fears and benefits of peer assessment; gather staff opinions on characteristics of an ideal assessor and willingness to receive assessors at their shelter.

❖ Piloting the Standards in 3 shelters and revision based on the assessment experience.

❖ Outreach by Scottish Women's Aid, through shelter newsletters with updates on the process; follow-up with individual facilities; and a formal event to launch the standards, involving the Working Group and related organizations. Communication messages promoted shelter buy-in for the standards, by reinforcing their purpose to: protect domestic violence services and increase state support; create evidence around shelter services and quality; and promote a comprehensive approach to ensure good practice across services.

Assessment process

The Standards are promoted through a peer-led and confidential assessment conducted over a 3-month period. The assessment can help shelters identify: innovative and promising practices; areas for improvement;'and supports needed from Scottish Women's Aid. The process involves:

❖ A shelter self-assessment based on evidence/ documentation available (2-3 weeks);

❖ Email submission of the form to the assessor (shelter staff with past assessment experience);

❖ Joint review of findings with the assessor, an explicitly supportive rather than advisory role; and Agreement of promising practices on the Scottish Women's Aid website.

Recommendations for replication

❖ *Allow sufficient time for the process to ensure shelters are fully engaged,* before expanding partnerships with other sectors and institutions (e.g. government bodies who may develop their own related criteria), considering staff turnover and other unexpected delays.

❖ *Employ and sustain participatory and inclusive processes* for the development of standards, as demonstrated in the multipronged approach used by Scottish Women's Aid.

❖ *Standards should integrate/ complement existing criteria* (e.g. the Scottish government's National Care Standards')

Resources:

Summary of Standards

Standards and Assessment Criteria

Guidance for shelters being assessed

Guidance for Assessors

Source: Ash Kuloo. 2012. Presentation at Second World Conference of Women's Shelters. Washington, D.C.

In addition to specific service requirements, directives may guide the development of effective partnerships between shelters and other service providers, as shelters in most jurisdictions are run at the local level. Partnerships between shelter advocates and workers and officials at different levels of state, as well as other community stakeholders, including police and child welfare agencies, are necessary.

For example, the Tasaru Ntomonok Initiative in Kenya, designed for women and girls fleeing female genital mutilation and forced marriages, demonstrates effective collaboration among partners. The shelter receives referrals from the local Department of Education, which also involves an intake process to clarify the details of each case. When girls access the belter, the Child Welfare Department is notified to help with family reconciliation if the girl's parents agree to not have their daughter undergo the practice. The shelter also assists with court processes for protection orders. The establishment of local networks and carefully fostered partnerships were key to implementing the national and sub-national laws and policies successfully. Read more about the Initiative.

Guidelines should also outline the training and capacity development needs for public officials responsible for funding and liaising with shelters and their workers, since they may not be familiar with issues of violence against women.

Examples of shelter protocols and guidelines to help standardize service provision mandated by legislation and supported by policy include:

❖ Australia: *Code of Practice for Specialist Family Violence Services for Women and Children 'Enhancing the safety of women and children in Victoria* (Domestic Violence Victoria, 2006). The guidance, supported by the Department of Human Services, aims to provide the basis for a shared understanding of the gendered nature and dynamics of family violence and establish a foundation for collaborative practice among services and across sectors responding to family violence. It is accompanied by standards for counselling and support groups.

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- ❖ Bosnia and Herzegovina: *Book of Rules on the Implementation of the Protection Measure of Sheltering Victims of Domestic Violence* (2006).The regulation provides a framework for which institutions may provide shelter services for women, what those services should entail and how they should be provided, including guidelines on infrastructure, staff competencies and rights of residents.

- ❖ Canada: *"I Built My House of Hove": Best Practices to Safely House Abused and Homeless Women* (Human Resources and Social Development Canada, 2009) which offers shelter workers information about how to safely house women and their children who have experienced violence, the different options for housing women (i.e. women staying in their homes, emergency shelters, longer-term options, etc.) and how to increase women's overall security.

- ❖ Moldova: *Model Regulations for the Rehabilitation Center for Victims of Violence* (2010) and *Frame Regulation on the organization and operation of assistance and protection centers for victims of trafficking in human beings* (2006)

- ❖ Serbia and Montenegro: *Code of Conduct for Establishing a Confidential* A/K'/Ze/fOSCE/ODIHR, 2001)

- ❖ South Africa: *Minimum Standards on Shelters for Abused Women* (Task Team on Shelters, Department of Social Development, 2001) set out principles in the provision of services; provide a framework for services from prevention efforts, ongoing support for survivors to identifying integrated and second stage housing; and establish guidelines for the operation, security and management of shelters, safe spaces, crisis centres in South Africa.

Illustrative Resources:

Service Delivery Standards for Member Programs (Iowa Coalition against Domestic Violence, USA, 2012). This resource provides detailed guidance on residential and non-residential services for women, children and perpetrators. Available in English.

National Service Standards for Domestic and Sexual Violence Core Standards (Women's Aid, UK, 2009). Available in English Policies and Procedures: Guidelines for Shelters (National Aboriginal Circle Against Family Violence, Canada available in English and French; Part 11 available in English and French.

Rights and responsibilities

Information on the rights and responsibilities of shelter residents is important to make

available as part of the arrival process to clarify expectations related to women's safety, participation and other aspects related to her stay at the shelter (e.g. the information that can be shared with non-residents; visitors guidelines or contact with abusers in cases of domestic violence, etc.).

Framing guidelines as rights and responsibilities rather than 'rules and regulations' aligns with the core principles of empowerment and self-determination, which should be integrated across all components of shelter services to ensure women's rights are truly promoted by service providers.

Rights and responsibilities should be designed with flexibility and responsiveness to women's needs and may complement or be part of the shelter policy.

They should describe the environment to be maintained at the shelter and should be posted or made easily accessible to residents. Key issues to be considered include:

❖ Safety and security (e.g. physical security of the facility; confidentiality of names, addresses and other information; and visitation)

❖ Use of shared and private spaces (e.g. housekeeping; maintenance of play areas for children; hours; respect of privacy; regulation of noise; and other house rules.)

❖ Interpersonal communication and behaviour between and among residents, their children, and staff (e.g. use of violence; respectful communication)

❖ Health (e.g. medical assistance; testing and disclosure related to communicable diseases, such as HIV; alcohol, cigarette and other substance use.)

❖ Opportunities for participation (house assembly, shelter council, support groups, workshops, training, committees, shared childcare schemes and meetings.)

❖ Other (e.g. responsibility for children; financial contributions; transition out of the shelter and re-entry; complaints processes; etc.) (Melbin et al., 2003).

Illustrative Example: Missouri Shelter Rules Project (United States)

In 2007, the Missouri Coalition Against Domestic and Sexual Violence (MCADSV), a state-wide network of over 100 domestic and sexual violence programmes, began a project to review the approach to rules used by shelters in the Coalition. The intervention aimed to improve the effectiveness of services provided by shelters, and developed in response to recurring challenges experienced by advocates and shelter staff in implementing rules (for example, related to children, chores, confidentiality, conflict resolution, curfew, drug and alcohol use, kitchens and food, medications, mental illness, entering/exiting the shelter, and participation in support groups and house meetings). The project has also

addressed the ongoing debate related to the need for rules and their alignment with shelter principles of empowerment and autonomy for women. During the pilot, an initial seven shelters chose to: remove written rules altogether (2 programmes); reduce the number of written rules in place (4 programmes); or improve policies and procedures for staff in place of written rules for residents (1 programme). After a year and a half, six shelters continued and seven new shelters joined the initiative. The Missouri experience demonstrates that minimal- rule approaches am main tain shelter structure and safety for survivors, while creating a more welcoming environment and providing more individualized services for women residents. This responds to survivor feedback on problematic rules as well as staff perspectives raised in defense of maintaining more comprehensive regulations (see Lyon, E., Lane, S. & Menard, A. 2008. *"Meeting Survivors' Needs: A Multi-State Study of Domestic Violence Shelter Experiences".* University of Connecticut School of Social Work and Anne Menard, National Resource Center on Domestic Violence).

Kev lessons from the intervention include:

❖ Shelters should have the organizational capacity to support internal transformation when revisiting their approach to rules (e.g. strong leadership and commitment to fully engage staff, while managing disagreement and resistance to change that may occur during the process).

❖ An intervention to revise rules may not be appropriate in all settings, particularly if there is strong resistance throughout the team that cannot be changed through multiple dialogues and training.

❖ It is important to involve, from the beginning, both shelter administrators/ managers as well as advocates/staff in the process of change, as each group has a particular role and perspective on the function of rules, and buy-in from all groups is necessary to successfully implement change.

❖ Additional training and continuous opportunities for dialogue should be provided to all staff to reinforce the shelter's values, approach to advocacy and service provision, as well as facilitate the process of change. Managers should be prepared to respond to staff changes, for instance, if staff members are unable to overcome their resistance to the intervention.

❖ Shelters may be more successful in transforming their use of rules when collaborating with other shelters or a coalition of shelters, or drawing upon the experience and support of others who have implemented similar changes.

❖ The process of transforming the environment within a shelter takes time and may

not be easy for managers or staff. Evaluation of the process should be conducted well-after the intervention has begun, to provide sufficient time for staff to reflect on the process and its outcomes on their advocacy practices and women's experiences.

❖ Physical changes to the shelter may facilitate the reduction of rules (e.g. creating separate sleeping or bathing spaces for women and their families; locked spaces for women to keep their food and belongings; safe areas for children to play without constant, direct supervision; security features to enable women to freely exit and enter the shelter, etc.). Despite initial costs, strategic investment in improving the living environment has long-term benefits on the effectiveness of the shelter and services provided by advocates.

❖ There are various approaches to supporting a minimal-rule environment, and each shelter should determine the most appropriate practices which meet the needs of its residents and enable staff to provide the most effective services.

The Missouri project experience is captured in the manual *How the Eurth Didn't Fly Into the Sun: Missouri's Protect to Reduce Rules in Domestic Violence Shelters* (Missouri Coalition Against Domestic and Sexual Violence, 2011), which also provides detailed guidance and templates for integrating a minimal-rule approach within a shelter.

Complaints Procedures:

Women should have opportunities to communicate any grievance or complaint they have with the staff or services being provided at the shelter. In addition to ongoing monitoring of services and mechanisms for receiving feedback from residents, a complaints process is important to enable shelters to address concerns of residents and improve the quality of its support.

A complaints process should cover a range of options available to ensure that women can raise their concerns in a manner in which they feel comfortable, and that problems are resolved using the most effective and appropriate methods (which may vary depending on the specific grievance).

Key considerations for establishing complaints procedures include:

❖ Determining an appropriate and realistic time frame for the shelter to address complaints.

❖ Identifying the different mechanisms which may be pursued by women to communicate and seek resolution for their complaints. These may involve:

- ✪ direct dialogue with relevant staff or their supervisor if the woman is unable or uncomfortable to speak with the staff involved;

- ✪ participation in a facilitated discussion or mediation on the issue;

- ✪ raising the issue in fora for shelter residents to discuss concerns or via representatives of residents, if such mechanisms exist; or

- ✪ providing confidential and anonymous written feedback, for example, through a locked complaints or comment box which is reviewed by shelter managers or a joint group of shelter staff and residents.

- ✪ filing a written complaint with the staff member, their supervisor or higher-level managers.

- ❖ Clarifying the chain of authority or levels through which complaints will be processed (e.g. supervisors, followed by shelter managers, executive director, and if needed, to the shelter's board or governing body).

Women should be informed of the complaints procedures upon their arrival at the shelter as well as when a particular issue is raised. Written information should also be available to all residents in accessible formats (i.e. hard copies of material in communal areas, with specific versions in the different languages used by residents, and alternative formats designed for women with communication disabilities or limited literacy) (WSCADV;WAVE, 2004).

Tools:

Training Manual for Improving Quality Services for Victims of Domestic Violence (Women Against Violence Europe, 2008) offers training modules for shelter workers on understanding the problem of violence against, the role of shelters, how to set up a shelter, how it should be funded, what services should be offered, how to maintain a safe and secure shelter and information about the management of shelters, community life in shelters, public relations, networking and evaluation.

Away from Violence: Guidelines for Setting Up and Running a Women's Refuge {Women Against Violence Europe, 2004). This briefing kit, developed by, is a resource for professionals intending to set up a shelter and may be used to support advocacy for improved policies and government support for shelters. The manual seeks to improve standards that may be applied across the various country-contexts in Europe and provides practical guidance on how to establish, organize, operate and manage a refuge (including the development of policies and procedures).

Model Rights and Responsibilities Model Rights and Responsibilities for Shelter Residents (Washi ngton State Coalition against Domestic Violence). This model policy is for shelter managers and staff, based on the context in the United States.

The resource provides guidance on the contents of shelter policies; a sample policy template that can be adapted as relevant: and a checklist of questions for reviewing existing shelter rules.

Model Grievance Form (Washington State Coalition against Domestic Violence). This model form is for shelter managers and staff, based on the context in the United States. It includes a brief overview of issues to be considered in the grievance process and a sample letter which may be used or adapted by shelters.

Shelter Rules (WSCADV). This online toolkit features audio visual materials, case studies, templates and other guidance to help shelter managers and staff understand and develop empowering guidelines for shelters that minimize control and maximize women's autonomy.

Combating violence against women: Minimum standards for support services (Alberta Council of Women's Shelters, 2008). This resource summarizes the state of service provision for survivors of violence against women across Europe and identifies minimum standards of service delivery, including include qualified staff, child care services and provision for residents to stay as long as required, regardless of their financial situation.

How the Earth Didn't Fly Into the Sun: Missouri's Project to Reduce Rules in Domestic Violence Shelters (Missouri Coalition Against Domestic and Sexual Violence, 2011). This manual provides guidance for integrating a minimal-rule approach within a shelter, with details on the experience of the Missouri Coalition Against Domestic Violence in the United States. The tool includes an overview of the Missouri project, as well as guidance for implementing changes in shelter rules, responding to challenges, and templates for resident and staff handbooks as well as surveys.

3.7 Operating Skill for security of women & children

Introduction :

Both women and children have been disproportionately affected by conflict as casualties of violence, as internally displaced persons and as refugees. Violence against women and children in conflict harms families, impoverishes communities and reinforces other forms of inequality. In addition, women and girls suffer direct violations of their physical integrity, for

example through reproductive violations and enforced pregnancy. Most recent conflicts have been rife with epidemic rates of sexual and gender-based violence, combined with high levels of gender-based human rights violations. The reality is that sexual violence has often been dismissed as an unfortunate consequence of conflict, resulting in widespread impunity for these crimes and general tolerance of gender based violence in post-conflict societies. It was in recognition of this pervasive problem that the African Union Peace and Security Department decided in 2010 to examine how best to develop targeted action to mitigate violence against women and children in armed conflict, building on the already existing normative frameworks.

Existing Normative Framework :

In 2003 and 2004, African heads of state adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa ("the Women's Protocol") and the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (SDGEA) which endorse the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 of 2000 on Women Peace and Security, the two documents call for the presence of women in conflict prevention and peace building activities in order to reverse their marginalization and abuse of human rights.

These international commitments are bolstered by some of the guiding principles of the AU, including the promotion of gender equality for which the AU Commission (AUC) has mandated a 50 per cent representation of women in its institutions. In the context of peace and security, the Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy (PCRD) 2006 also commit member states to that same principle.

Building on UN Security Council Resolution 1325, the Gender Policy of the African Union (2009) equally calls for the effective participation of women in peace support operations, conflict prevention, mitigation and post conflict reconstruction and development efforts, as well as for an increase in women participation in all processes aimed at maintaining peace and security and avoiding relapse into conflict.

Going Beyond the Normative Framework :

As noted above, while significant progress has been made in outlining a comprehensive human rights architecture for the continent, and within this to provide mechanisms to both prevent and address violence against women and children in conflicts, gross violations including sexual violence, displacement, recruitment of children by armed forces or groups, loss of life and livelihoods remain widespread. Despite the adoption of various legal mechanisms and resolutions, impunity for violations remains widespread and this is

compounded by women's marginalisation in peace processes and post-conflict reconstruction programmes. As with all international and regional agreements, the central challenge is to affect the shift from ratification to domestication and implementation in order to realise the rights of all Africans.

Notwithstanding the existence of a strong normative framework conducive to the institutionalization of a gender sensitive culture within the AU, the effective implementation of key recommendations in the field of gender, peace and security has been weak at all levels.

As the Department tasked with implementing the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the decisions of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), as well as managing the AU's objectives in so far as promoting peace and responding to crisis situations is concerned, the Peace and Security Department represents the key entry point for gender mainstreaming into the continental peace and security agenda.

Fully cogniscent of the centrality of its mandate and of the need to include women in the peace and stabilization efforts in Africa, the Peace and Security Department (PSD) of the AU has taken concrete steps to mainstream gender into the work of its Department at the institutional, operational and programmatic level.

Concrete steps undertaken by the Peace and Security Department:

1. PSD Roadmap for gender mainstreaming: 2011-2013:

PSD understands that responsibility for the implementation of a gender policy must be diffused across the organization structure, rather than concentrated in a small central Unit, which prompted the Department's initiative, in June 2011, to develop a comprehensive roadmap and action plan for the period from 2011 to 2013, which seek to enhance the gender perspective into all aspects of the Department's work, especially within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), various policies and activities, through building gender capacity and accountability.

The roadmap has given an entire section (XIII) to the topic of women, peace and security. It lists several activities that were taken up by the AU Commission to strengthen the normative basis for the protection of women in armed conflicts and their successful implementation is on the way. These include, on the one hand, the consideration of the introduction of a Special Representative on Sexual Violence in the context of armed conflict; on the other hand, regular training sessions for AU headquarters and field staff to strengthen their skills in gender mainstreaming in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions. These trainings are an important measure to

increase awareness of the AU personnel on gender issues in the context of conflict prevention and response.

2.   The Panel of the Wise Study:

The Panel of the Wise, one of the important pillars of APSA, and a consultative body of the Peace and Security Council, mandated to provide opinions on issues relevant to conflict prevention, management, and resolution has undertaken a comprehensive study on "Womena dn Children in Armed Conflicts" with the view to recommend ways to step up the implementation of existing commitments made by the Heads of State and Government, and various stakeholders in eliminating forms of violence against civilians, particularly women, girls and boys in armed conflict. Recommendations are grouped under six main headings: (i) Commitment and ratification; (ii) Promoting AU institutional co-ordination; (iii) Monitoring and documentation; (iv) Promoting accountability mechanisms; (v) Prevention and early warning; and (vi) Supporting AU-REC relations. The extensive study is expected to be submitted to the Assembly of Heads of states and Government in January 2014.

The report outlines both the considerable developments in the African Union's human rights architecture, as well as the challenges faced in the implementation of mechanisms aimed specifically to address issues related to women and children in armed conflicts. The report includes a number of recommendations directed to the AU at large, as well as to the Commission, in order to strengthen African instruments for mitigating violence against women, girls and boys in conflict situations. It also identifies ways in which the Panel of the Wise can assist in devising measures to consolidate the efforts of the AU through ensuring the implementation of existing obligations. By so doing the AU can address, politically and substantially, the vulnerabilities of women, girls and boys in armed conflict situations.

3. The Annual Open Sessions of the PSC on Women and children in Armed Conflicts: the Livingston Formula:

In December 2008, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) held a retreat in Livingstone, Zambia and agreed on a mechanism for interaction between the PSC and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa. This is mechanism is known as the **"Livingstone Formula".** The Livingstone Formula has provided an opportunity for CSOs to contribute to the efforts of the PSC of the AU to foster peaceful and stable societies and to protect civilians, especially women and children. This collaboration of the AU and civil society has helped bring to the

forefront, the personal stories of women and children during armed conflict and has further opened the door for civil society to impact AU processes to safeguard the livelihoods of women and children, and for the AU to support civil society in mobilizing national, community and continental efforts towards sustainable peace initiatives.

As AU and its Member States were demonstrating a firm commitment to address issues related to both women and children in armed conflicts through well-defined human rights mechanisms, and by declaring the year 2010 the beginning of the AU Decade for Women (2010-20) which is intended to accelerate the implementation of the AU's policy framework to promote the rights of women on the continent, the PSD took advantage of these opportunities to launch the Livingston Formula with a PSC open session on Women and Children in Africa in March 2010 in Addis Ababa. ***At the conclusion of its meeting, the AU PSC made a decision to devote an open session, every year, to the theme of women and children and other vulnerable groups in armed conflicts.*** In convening these open session meetings, the PSC recognizes that a focus on women and children brings into clear view the wider human security dimensions of the AU peace and security agenda. Moreover, the Panel of the Wise took adavatneg of the opportunity to present the initial findings of its above-mentioned report on "Women and Children in Armed Conflict" to frame the discussions.

During the second AU Peace and Security Council open session, in March 2011, the AU Panel of the Wise requested FAS in partnership with UN Women, Urgent Action Fund (UAF) Africa, Oxfam, Isis Women International Cross-Cultural Exchange (Isis WICCE) to mobilize women survivors of sexual violence from DRC, South Sudan, Uganda, Guinea, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire to produce a statement consolidating their views and recommendations. The statement included testimonies and recommendations on interventions regarding prevention of sexual violence and the rehabilitation of survivors. One of the key recommendations the women made was for the need for a holistic postconflict rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes to provide psychological, medical, legal, and financial support to women and children affected by conflicts. Related to this, the women survivors made a recommendation for the provision of a recovery fund for them to get economic empowerment and develop targeted programmes to be financially independent and claim their rightful role in the post conflict reconstruction.

At the third Open session of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) held on 26 March 2013, Council took note of the statements made by the Commissioner for Peace and

Security, the Director of Women, Gender and Development Directorate (WGDD), as well as United Nations agencies (UN Women and UNICEF), which focused on the role of Women in the promotion of peace in Africa since in Africa 1963; the contemporary nature of the threats to women and children in conflict areas; progress made since the PSC's last meeting in 2011 as regard to the protection of women and children in armed conflicts; review of various innovative and successful initiatives by non state actors and propose ways to support them.

3.8 Skills in Handling Radio Communications

❖ Introduction

❖ The purpose of radio communication is to provide the security personnel, the required guidance for knowing basic communication procedures.

❖ Skills are also required for knowing physical principles of radio operations.

❖ General Rules:

❖ All radios within a network consist of two or more radios operating on the same frequency or electromagnetic wave.

❖ Radio networks may operate on High frequency (HF) or Very High Frequency (VHF).HF radios use waves along the ground or reflections of waves off portions of the atmosphere to bounce signals from one station to another. VHF Radio waves travel in a short range.

❖ Radio Security must be kept in mind. Regular radios are public but radios used by security personnel are private. Radios can be deliberately "jammed" so that messages can neither be sent nor be received.

❖ Transmitting massages

❖ The frequency selection switch must be properly set to the correct frequency.

❖ One must know that only one person can broadcast at a time.

❖ While talking the 'Talk switch" is to be pressed but after talking that switch must be pressed again and released or eise the other person's reply will not be heard.

❖ One must not hold the microphone too dose to the mouth and he /she must not shout while speaking.

❖ Long conversations must be avoided as that will prevent other carters from communicating.

- ❖ Whenever a Security personhel gets into a Serious Crisis or emergency situation he must be given priority to speak, in such a situation he must repeat "Emergency Emergency Emergency" three times and give out his identity code.

- ❖ In a, not-a-serious crisis , the called must say "Security Security Security" three times and identify himseif.

- ❖ The Security personnel must know that the radios must be maintained property.

- ❖ The radio and battery must not be kept continuously in the charger so that the battery does not get over-charged. There may be different kinds of chargers, for example chargers with no indicator light, chargers with Teiiow indicator lights to indicate that the charger is working, chargers with Red indicator lights to indicate that the battery is accepting the charge and Red and Green indicator lights where the red light indicate that the charger is working and the radio battery is accepting the charge, here the red light will go out as soon as the battery is fully charged and the green light will come on

- ❖ It must always be kept in mind that security personnel must keep their batteries recharged so that the radio can function. These HF or VHf Radios normally operate on 12 Volt battery and therefore, in worst situation, these batteries can be recharged by piacing those batteries in a vehicle and by running the vehicle engine till the battery is charged.

- ❖ The Radio is a vital equipment in the possession of a security personnel, therefore it must be taken care properly.

- ❖ The radio shouid never be carried along with its antenna .

- ❖ The radio should not be dropped on banged hard or else it might get damaged.

3.8.1 Radio Communication for Security

We all know that communication skills are amongst the most important skills that a security officer can posses. Often, we need to relay messages and information further than would otherwise be possible via verbal means, in order to achieve this, a security officer has a number of tools at his/her disposal, such as the mobile phone, short message service, Morse code (not so common these days) and of course, the radio.

In this article, we are going to look at some of the more basic, but all too often forgotten radio proccedures required for the quick, concise and accurate transmission of information via radio.

Basic Procedure

It is important to remember that strict radio procedures and disciplines need to be adhered to at all times when using a radio, whether it be a hand held, vehicle based or a base station set up. This is important for a number of reasons. First and foremost, we observe strict radio procedures to preserve the security of the information being transmitted. Regardless of how secure the equipment you are using may be, always operate on the basis that someone could be listening in on your transmissions. Therefore, names of operatives and locations involved in a particular operation should be disguised via the use of code words or call signs.

Call Signs

When used in radio communications, call signs can perform a number of functions. Their primary function is often to protect the identity of the parties involved in the radio transmission. However, they also serve to simplify matters when communicating between large groups of people. For example, can you imagine trying to communicate with someone on a first name basis when there are three people in the group all called David? Not to mention that it is unreasonable to expect that every person in a group remember everyone's name.

Instead, it is far easier and safer to assign call signs based either on the Phonetic alphabet or a person's area of responsibility. For example, C1, C2, C3, pronounced Charlie One, two and three, would be used in place of Ralph, Fred and Bill. This way each person knows who is being called and there is no risk of him or her being identified. Alternatively, if you had three members of your team assigned to the stage area at a rock concert, you could assign them the call signs: Stage one, two and three. Once again, the identity of the caller is preserved and everyone knows exactly who he or she is communicating with.

Code words

Code words and call signs are used for much the same reasons - to prevent the true nature of the subject being discussed from being overheard by uninvited listeners. Take for example a situation where a security officer receives a radio call informing him that the door to one of the venue's cash offices has a broken lock. The call also informs him that the staff member at that location will be leaving the area unattended for a period of time. He is therefor requested to get someone there to keep an eye on the money. If anyone were listening in on the conversation, it would be a simple matter of getting there first or worse,

taking the officer out of the picture and helping themselves to the contents of the cash office.

To avoid this situation, code words can be assigned to specific types of incidents or locations. For example, rather than saying the cash office on the third floor in the member's area, you could refer to its location as "Members 3". Incidents can also be assigned code words such as "Code Blue", which might refer to a non-crucial incident requiring assistance when possible. An incident that requires more immediate assistance but is not yet dangerous could be a "Code Yellow" and a serious incident that requires immediate assistance could be a "Code Red". Similarly, specific incidents can be assigned specific code words. For example, a violent situation could be "Cyclone". Back up needed could be "Tanto." There are no set rules for assigning code words. Some people like to use words that employ the same first letter as the area they are referring to and other people like to use words that reflect the nature or function of a particular area or incident. Use any code word you like as long as the team know it and can remember it.

By employing code words, you make it difficult for anyone with criminal intentions to interfere with your operations. Take our example of the cash office from earlier in the article. Someone wishing to take advantage of the opportunity knows after hearing the call, who is attending, where the cash is and the nature of the problem. However, by employing the system of code words and call sign as discussed the call might sound something like this:

" Cash office to security. We have a Code Blue at Members 3. Require assistance."

"OK cash office. Escort one en route to Members 3."

What we have just ascertained is that there is an incident at the cash office in the member's area on level three that requires attention when possible. This has been acknowledged and one of the cash escort security officers is on the way.

The following key words are used in order to covey certain messages.

❖ ROGER: means message understood

❖ OVER: Call sign has transmitted and awaiting reply

❖ OUT: Call sign is finished transmitting at this time

When transmitting messages, these words used in conjunction with correct procedures make a message far more concise and easier to understand. The correct procedure for transmitting a message is as follows:

1. Start the message with your call, Sign and then say the call sign of the person you wish to contact.

1. Any time you expect a response, finish you transmission with the word OVER. This will let the person you are talking to know you are waiting for their reply.

2. When you are responding to someone else's message, use the word ROGER to let them know you have understood their transmission. If you didn't understand the transmission for some reason ask them to repeat the message by saying, "Repeat last call".

1. When you have finished your transmission and wish to end the conversation use the word OUT. This lets the person you are talking to know that you are finished. It also lets anyone eise waiting to use the radio know that the channel is clear and they can go ahead.

When putting ail of the previous examples in practice, you should have a short exchange that is easily understood, accurate and concise. Let's look at the earlier example of the cash office incident again. A conversation between trained radio operators should "sound" something like this:

"Cash office to Security, OVER."

"Security, go ahead Cash Office, OVER."

"Security, we have a Code Blue at Members 3, Over."

"ROGER Cash Office, Escort 1 en route, OVER."

"ROGER Security, Cash office OUT."

You can see how much more efficient and secure this example is. Cutting out the call signs once communications in this relay are established, can shorten this example even further.

Common Problems With Radio Procedure

Cutting short transmissions

There are a number of common problems that can occur with officers who have either little or no time on a radio net. Probably the most common of these problems is accidentally cutting off the first few seconds of a transmission. This is especially annoying if you are the person they are trying to contact. By cutting off the first few seconds of their transmission, the caller effectively cuts off their own call sign.

As a result, all you here is your call sign with no idea of who is calling.

To prevent this problem from occurring, simply push the transmit button on the radio and count to two before you begin to relay your message. Do this every time you transmit

and you should get your message through loud and clear every time.

Make Sure That You Pay Attention To Radio Cails:

Another problem common to people who have little or no experience on a radio net is inattentiveness. Be aware of your call sign and be vigilant for its use. There are few things more annoying than someone who won't answer their radio either because they are not paying attention to transmissions or because they have turned their unit down or knocked the volume and can no longer hear it properly. The solutions to both these problems are simple - pay attention to radio calls and check your volume at regular intervals.

If for some reason you are going to be unavailable for any period of time, call your supervisor and let them know and then inform them when you are back on air. If you are tied up with a patron or in the middle of something, rather than just ignoring your radio, respond with your caller's call sign followed by your own and then say "stand by". When you are free to talk, open communications with the last caller using correct procedure and say "go ahead".

Don't Babble!

People who babble to hear their own voice and to express their importance can be extremely annoying. These people distract other staff, clog up radio channels and make it difficult for anyone else trying to use the radio.

Training Sessions

Here are a few basic guidelines for training in the correct use of radios:

❖ During training sessions, set up a program designed to get staff familiar with using call signs and code words. Simulate instances and responses to situations using the radio so that everyone gets experience using the correct procedures This is the best practice other than on the job experience.

❖ Try and use the best quality that you can afford. These will usually be more reliable and offer better clarity.

❖ Become familiar with the radio. Make sure you can operate all of its switches by feel in the dark.

❖ Make sure you have spare batteries available and suitable recharging equipment.

❖ Keep talk time to a bare minimum. No chit chat. Operational use only.

❖ An ear peace is recommended for added security and clarity, especially when in high noise areas. It also enables you to receive messages hands free.

❖ Remember, everything you say can be heard. Therefore, don't say anything you do not want anyone one else to here.

❖ Learn the Phonetic Alphabet. Any word can be spelled out with clarity using this internationally recognised protocol.

❖ Don't forget to do a radio check not only when you first receive your radio but again when you are in your area of operation.

3.8.2 Skills for better radio communication

❖ The portable radio is the single-most versatile piece of equipment that a firefighter or officer can carry into a hazardous situation.

❖ Why do I believe that? Because portable radios are the primary means for:

❖ All responders to begin becoming informed and educated about the incident once the first firefighter or officer arrives on the scene;

❖ The incident commander to execute command and control activities;

❖ Officers and firefighters deployed to tactical assignments in the hazard area to communicate their observations and progress to the IC and to receive updated orders; and

❖ Personnel in the hazard area back to talk to the IC should there be a Mayday event.

For all of the above types of communication to work, however, it is imperative that all portable radios on the scene are in good working order and that all personnel are skilled and practiced in their operation.

Know your hardware

Your life may one day depend upon knowing which button or knob on your portable radio to use — and you might only have one chance to get it right. Using the incredible capabilities of today's portable radios is a critical skill, and like any other skill, if you don't use it, you lose it.

Practice often using your radio's different features while wearing firefighting gloves, especially with those features that you don't routinely use. If that day comes when you really need a particular feature of your radio, chances are you'll be in a firefight, so prepare.

Maintain the radio and its battery according to the manufacturer's recommendations. All of the major radio manufacturers have gone to great lengths to produce operating

manuals and supporting media. Take advantage of these to build your body of knowledge about your radio.

Follow the manufacturer's recommendations for charging the batteries. Label the batteries and keep a battery log; in the log, track each battery's life cycle. Replace a battery when it no longer holds a charge for the recommended length of time. Carbon particles from smoke, dirty water, sheetrock dust and other fireground goo can quickly compromise radio functions. Compressed air cleaners, like those used to clean computer keyboards and other electronic equipment, are great for keeping microphone and speaker ports clear of debris.

Pay particular attention to contact points for remote microphones and clean according to the manufacturer's recommendations. An ordinary pencil eraser is a good tool for removing corrosion safely, so keep those contacts shiny for maximum performance.

Remember Murphy's Law. If something can go wrong, it will go wrong and usually at the most inopportune time. Carefully review and practice troubleshooting guidance provided by the manufacturer. Your ability to work through a radio malfunction on scene may be critical to your safety and that of others.

Basic radio practices

Learn and master the following components of radio communication under non-stressful conditions. Doing so will greatly enhance your portable radio communication, especially when the heat is on.

❖ Before speaking, formulate what information is being communicated and put the information in a standardized reporting template. If your organization has a standardized format for radio communications, learn it and use it consistently. An example of such a format is: [Who are you calling?] "Command [Who are you?] from Engine 26. [Where are you?] My crew is on stairwell, advancing to second floor with attack line. [CPR (conditions, progress and resources)]. Heavy heat and smoke conditions. Holding our position. Need ventilation of second floor before we can continue."

❖ Often, ICs are overwhelmed by excess information on the radio. This is where consistent use of a standard radio-reporting format will help determine if information needs to be transmitted. Develop your radio discipline by asking yourself: Has anything changed from my last CPR report? If face-to-face communication is possible between members of a crew and the information is not needed by the IC, don't get on the radio.

❖ Emergency scenes are heavy with noise pollution from running apparatus and portable power equipment like saws, ventilation fans, etc. Your radio might also be exposed to rain, snow or water from firefighting operations. Minimize microphone exposure by practicing shield, move and talk — shield the microphone using your hand, the bill of your helmet or your turnout coat; move away from the source of exposure, even if you can only turn your back to the source; talk directly into the microphone as much as possible, and keep the microphone 1 to 2 inches away from your mouth. If you do not have a speaking diaphragm or voice port on your facepiece, position the microphone against your lower jawbone on the skirt of the face-piece.

❖ When speaking into a microphone use a loud, clear and controlled voice — avoid shouting. When excited, our speech is often both louder and faster. When this happens, our radio transmissions can be unintelligible and may require the IC to ask for a rebroadcast, and thus more radio traffic on the channel. If your intended receiver is consistently asking you to repeat radio communication, you probably need to work on this.

These skills can improve your radio transmissions quality, but what about the communication that comes your way? All of that noise pollution can certainly diminish your ability to hear the information that others are trying to get to you via your radio.

Hearing aid

The introduction of the remote microphone for portable radios, or collar mic, has greatly helped to overcome this challenge, but we lose that advantage when we don't keep the remote mic in close proximity to our ear.

Another useful adjunct is a set of foam earplugs; these can reduce the level of high-frequency noise from engines, power saws, operating hose lines, etc., and enable radio communications to be more clearly understood.

I found this to be true as a command officer. After I'd declared the incident under control, I would leave the noise-controlled environment of my command vehicle to do some managing by walking around. My earplugs enabled me to clearly hear all radio traffic coming over my remote mic that was clipped to the collar of my turnout coat.

Yet, technical issues can arise. You need to recognize technical problems and take corrective action to improve communications. Do not tolerate an inoperable radio when you are in the hazard area. If you cannot communicate with the incident commander, it's an accountability and safety issue. Get it fixed or get out.

Radio position

The optimal position for a portable radio transmission is at head height with the antenna in a vertical position. Not exactly the position you may find yourself when involved in fire combat operations, right?

Place your radio in the radio pocket of your turnout coat while you're crawling along the floor and this is what you have. What's the problem? The radio's antenna is far from its optimal transmitting position and some of the transmitted energy is absorbed by your body.

The result is a poor radiation pattern and a reduction in range of the radio. One solution is to move to a position where you can sit up and get the radio closer to its optimal transmitting position.

Many users do not use a radio pocket or radio case. While this certainly puts the radio in a slightly better transmitting position, it also exposes the radio to heat, smoke, water and particulates. Left unprotected, the radio may fail to operate when you most need it.

Radio cases with shoulder straps provide little protection and are an entanglement hazard when worn on the exterior of turnouts.

Good radio communications are critical for safe, efficient and effective operations on the emergency scene. How many times has poor incident communications been cited as a significant factor in NIOSH investigations of firefighter fatalities on the fire-ground?

Follow the advice I've provided here and I firmly believe that you'll have taken significant steps to minimize poor communication, and in turn, set up you and your team for fire-ground success.

Radio Networks

Mingara has a comprehensive knowledge and background in radio communication technologies, with competencies including the following:

Mingara's expertise in the provision radio communications advice is highly sought after, including for:

❖ Public Safety radio/wireless networks
❖ Public transport radio communications
❖ Mobile phone network coverage
❖ Emergency warning systems

Mingara's radio communications capabilities are as expansive as they are varied, with an example of our skill sets provided below:

❖ RF surveys (indoor/outdoor & field measurements)

❖ Witness acceptance testing & radio site commissioning

❖ Frequency planning, selection & licensing

❖ Simulcast design

❖ Radio site/tower RF design

❖ Antenna and feeder system design

❖ Point-to-point path profiles

❖ Work packages development

❖ Radio site audits

❖ Mobile blackspot/coverage analysis

❖ Interference analysis

❖ RF coverage predictions (click for details)

❖ Construction logistics & project management

RF coverage prediction

Mingara has the latest RF coverage prediction software, with extensive terrain and land use datasets broad range of coverage prediction services. Mingara offers RF coverage prediction services for the communications systems, from single site land mobile services to nationwide 3G networks. Point to VHF, UHF and microwave can be modelled by Mingara using our specialist path profile tools.

Based on proven experience in RF design, Mingara can provide additional value for clients by recommending suitable coverage prediction models and design parameters.

Mingara can deliver RF coverage predictions as high quality plots, images or as a GIS layer suitable for clients to import directly into their own mapping tools.

Mingara also has extensive experience with radio technologies.

Technology competencies:

❖ Fixed and mobile satellite communications

❖ Paging systems (POCSAG, Flex)

❖ Mobile data networks (RDLAP, Mobitex, CDMA lxRTT, EDGE and WCDMA, HSDPA)

- ❖ Analogue trunked networks (MPT1327, ED ACS)
- ❖ Digital trunked networks (TETRA, ASTRO, P25)
- ❖ Mobile voice communications systems (PMR)
- ❖ Mobile telephony (GSM, GSM-R, CDMA, 3GPP, 3G, LTE, Mission Critical LTE)
- ❖ Wireless 802.11 a/b/g/n
- ❖ Indoor and outdoor radio transmission systems

An emergency communication system (ECS) is any system (typically, computer-based) that is organized for the primary purpose of supporting one-way and two-way communication of emergency messages between both individuals and groups of individuals. These systems are commonly designed to integrate the cross-communication of messages between varieties of communication technologies, forming a *unified* communication system intended to optimize communications during emergencies.

Emergency communication vs. notification

An emergency notification system refers to a collection of methods that facilitate the one-way dissemination or broadcast of messages to one or many groups of people with the details of an occurring or pending emergency situation. Mass automated dialing services such as Reverse 911, and common siren systems that are used to alert for tornadoes, tsunami, air-raid, etc., are examples of emergency notification systems.

Emergency communication systems often provide or integrate those same notification services but will also include two-way communications typically to facilitate communications between emergency communications staff, affected people and first responders in the field. Another distinguishing attribute of the term "communication" may be that it implies the ability to provide detailed and meaningful information about an evolving emergency and actions that might be taken; whereas "notification" denotes a relatively more simplistic one-time conveyance of the existence and general nature of an emergency (such as Emergency Rescue Location).

Alternate and related terms

Being a collection of methods that are often incorporated in many diverse settings in varying ways, there are numerous words, terms, phrases, **and** jargon that are used interchangeably among the entities that utilize or have a need for emergency communication systems; but in most instances, these are all used to refer to the same or

substantially similar concept. For example, use of the terms "emergency communications" and "disaster **communications" definitively refer** to the same concept, with the only potential difference lying in the connotation, or **emotional meaning.**

- ❖ Emergency Notification
- ❖ Emergency Notification System
- ❖ Emergency Notification Service
- ❖ Emergency Communications
- ❖ Emergency Communications System
- ❖ Emergency Communications Service
- ❖ Emergency Response Software
- ❖ Unified Emergency Communications
- ❖ Emergency Warning System
- ❖ Emergency Management System
- ❖ Emergency Management Software
- ❖ Alerting System
- ❖ Emergency Alert
- ❖ Emergency Alert
- ❖ System (not to be confused with EAS)
- ❖ Emergency Alerting System
- ❖ Notification System
- ❖ Unified Communication System
- ❖ Public Mass Notification
- ❖ Public Notification System
- ❖ Mass Notification
- ❖ Mass Notification System
- ❖ Network-centric emergency notification
- ❖ Network-Centric Emergency Communication
- ❖ Unified Emergency Communication System
- ❖ Disaster Communication System
- ❖ Emergency Public Warning System

Need

Emergencies place demands on communication processes that are often significantly different from the demands of nonemergency circumstances. Emergencies often involve escalating and evolving events that demand high performance and flexibility from the systems that provide emergency communication services. Message prioritisation, automation of communication, fast message delivery, communication audit trails, and other capabilities are often required by each unique emergency situation. Inadequate emergency communications capabilities can have consequences that are inconvenient at best and disastrous at worst.

Case studies, failures and successes

New York City World Trade Center attack

During the September 11 attack in 2001, traditional telecommunications were stretched and overloaded. Phone networks along the entire East Coast were congested into uselessness. 911 operators were overwhelmed with calls and could do little more than offer encouragement because of the confusing information they were receiving. Communications between emergency services personnel were limited by a lack of interoperability between departments. Many fire-fighters died when the towers collapsed because they couldn't receive the warning that the police officers received from the New York City Police Department (NYPD) helicopters. Amateur radio played a large role in facilitating communications between the various emergency departments, which operated on different frequencies and protocols.

London Underground bombings

On the day of the 7 July 2005 London bombings, mobile phone networks, including Vodafone, reached full capacity and were overloaded by 10:00 a.m., only an hour and ten minutes after the bombs went off. Because of an antiquated radio system, the damaged trains were unable to communicate with the Transport for London control center or emergency personnel, while senior emergency services managers, of the London Ambulance Service in particular, were forced to rely on the already overloaded mobile phone network because of the lack of digital radios. The Access Overload Control, implemented only in a 1 km area around Aldgate Tube Station, wasn't helpful because many officials didn't have ACCOLC- enabled mobile phones. In the aftermath, the London Assembly determined the need for a digital radio communications system in London that can operate underground.

2011 Joplin, Missouri tornado

161 people were killed and at least 990 injured when an EF5 multiple-vortex tornado

hit Joplin, Missouri. Because Joplin is located in a tornado-heavy area of the country, many people considered the tornado sirens routine and ignored them. Instead, many residents waited until they received confirmation from another, non-routine, source, such as seeing the tornado, a radio or TV report, or hearing a second siren. In the aftermath, an assessment team recommended that emergency warnings take risk perception into account to convey a sense of urgency. NOAA Officials are considering ways to charge the warning system to distinguish smaller tornadoes from more deadly ones.

Hurricane Katrina

When Hurricane Katrina, a Category 5 hu: i , hitN Orlcan. the commu completely destroyed, including power stations, internet servers, mobile phone towers, and 9ii services, ine federal ie

workers' satellite phones weren't interoperable, even when they did work.™ A few AM radio stations were able to continue broadcasting throughout the storm, notably WWL Radio, which remained on the air by broadcasting from a closet. Amateur radio was instrumental in the rescue process and maintained signals when 911 communications were damaged or overloaded.

Virginia Tech Massacre

The Virginia Tech Massacre, which resulted in the death of 33 people, helped propel discourse for effective emergency communication systems in schools. Virginia Tech had systems already in place, including e-mail and text notifications, but lacked a cohesive plan for using them. No warnings were sent out until after the event, two and a half hours after the initial shootings. Virginia Tech has since updated its emergency communications systems, especially public ones, since students can't always check e-mail in a timely fashion and professors often request that wireless devices be turned off in class. Because the massacre occurred within a 10-minute period, other schools have also implemented new, improved emergency communications systems with an emphasis on speed of communication.

2011 Tohoku Earthquake

The Japan Meteorological Agency's (JMA) early warning system, which uses seismometers, was able to alert millions of people across Japan about the impending earthquake via radio, mobile phone networks, including Docomo, AU, and Soft Bank, and television, including both NHK channels and cable channels. The tsunami warning system alerted people shortly after, although the tsunami was larger than expected. In areas with infrastructure still intact, even though both landline and mobile phone lines were not functioning

as might be expected, the Internet was still accessible. In the hardest hit areas, particularly Sendai and other areas of Miyagi, Iwate, and Fukushima Prefectures, satellite phones were often the only form of communication that functioned reliably. The following nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Plant was rife with communications problems. No communications plan was in place, internal communications were poor, external communications were slow, and the public quickly lost confidence in TEPCO and the nuclear industry. The primary criticism was a failure of the government to release accurate information about the disaster. Calls were made for more transparency and promptness with future events.

2012 Aurora movie theater shooting

During the 2012 Aurora shooting on July 20, 2012, the gunman, James Eagan Holmes, released tear gas before opening fire during a showing of *The Dark Knight Rises,* causing many of the moviegoers to mistake the attack for part of the film's special effects. According to preliminary reports, the suspect initially went into the theater as a patron. He then exited and propped open an emergency exit, while he went to his car to get his bulletproof vest and weapons. He then attacked after reentry through the propped-open door.™ In this type of situation, there could have been considerable warning. Technology exists that can warn about open doors (such as an emergency door that shouldn't normally be open), and can send clear warning and instructions to any number of devices, including a movie screen. There is also a significant opportunity to consider the use of the theater's fire alarm system. Shortly after the assailant began shooting, the building's fire alarms were sounded. The natural inclination, in response to a fire alarm, would be to evacuate the building, but in this case, the assailant was specifically targeting people who attempted to exit.

Hurricane Sandy

Hurricane Sandy hit New York City, New Jersey, and the surrounding area on October 29, 2012, destroying thousands of houses and leaving millions without electricity and thus without internet, mobile phones, or landline communications.™ To prepare for the hurricane, many areas provided additional emergency help lines in case 911 wasn't available, The Federal Emergency Management Agency has strengthened its ability to respond to a disaster since the communications problems during Hurricane Katrina and using Twitter in its rescue efforts, and amateur radio operators were on standby to provide emergency communications. In the aftermath, up to 25% of mobile phone towers, network providers, and television stations were powerless. Communications have been steadily improving, however, although the hardest hit reas are still experiencing serious power outages.

Attributes

Timeliness and speed of delivery

An emergency, as defined by Merriam-Webster, is an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action. As such, it should be considered critically important that any communication about an emergency be timely and quick to disseminate, in order to mitigate damage or loss of life. For example, during the Virginia Tech massacre, about two hours had passed before the first communication (an email) was sent to staff and students; and by

that time, the gunman had already entered and secured a building in which he was'shortly to begin his attack. In that case, it wasn't until about 20 minutes after the shootings began, that a loudspeaker announcement was made for people to take cover. In many cases, it's likely obvious that-mere seconds and minutes are absolutely critical.

Ease of use

During a crisis, the people who use an ECS need to quickly and easily launch their notifications and they need to be able to do so in a way that securely provides them with confidence and an intuitive, familiar and easy-to-use interface that can be accessed from any location. An emergency communication system that's designed for non-technical users will ensure successful administration and usage; and during some life-threatening emergency situations, campus administrators must be able to react quickly and trigger the alert system swiftly. Yet emergency alert is probably among the least used and least familiar processes. Ease-of-use therefore is critical to the effectiveness of an emergency communication system.

However, in order to support a robust and capable emergency communication ability, this ease of use should not preclude the utilization of a complex, technologically advanced system. A sufficiently advanced system is required to coordinate multiple components to act in concert, to initiate and propagate emergency communications in any manner of ways. A distinguishing factor is in such a system bearing these advanced capabilities, while still being easy for the user to operate for both emergency and everyday communications *(so users can feel comfortable with it)* — not only for effective emergency communication, but also for an organization to realize the most return on investment, as well as the user being familiar enough with its operation as to effectively operate it under stressful emergency situations, such as in earthquake, tsunami, etc.

Affordability

Overall, the more affordable the cost of procuring, installing, and maintaining an

emergency communication system is, the more prolific such systems may become; and the more prolific these systems are, the more likely it is that these systems will be available to aid in times of emergency in more locations. According to Federal Signal, beyond supporting emergency response, today's mass notification systems have proven to be a valuable asset for everyday, non-emergency, intra- and inter-plant communications. This has become particularly evident in the deployment of interoperable, multi-device communications technology that not only enhances overall plant communications, but provides a host of useful software-based management and administrative tools. Additionally, many of the more traditional approaches to mass notification, i.e., public address and intercom systems, e-mail, and voice and text messaging, provide everyday functionality for plant communications and process control that represents attractive potential for return on investment.

Providing instructions

A clearly needed attribute of any modem emergency communication system is the ability to not only provide notification an emergency, but to also provide clear and actionable instructions for how to respond to an emergency. In a study by the Rehabilitation Engineering Research Center for Wireless Technologies, it was revealed that regardless of the initial form of notification, a secondary form was necessary before action would be taken. This supports the important observation that providing clear and concise instructions may reduce dependency on such secondary verification; and thus, providing instructions may save lives in an urgent emergency situation.

Specific audiences or recipients

Emergencies often require delivery of different versions of the same communication at the same time. For example, in an armed hostage-taking incident, occupants of a building may need to receive instructions to lock and barricade the door until further notice, while first responders to the incident need to be aware of the lockdown instructions and be provided more specific details of the hostage-taking event to inform their actions.

Using the hostage-taking example, some of the more modem emergency communication systems such as Siemens Sygnal or Message Net Connections state the ability to deliver a single message that provides full details to first responders while filtering that same message to provide more limited instructions to lock doors to the general public. By utilizing a single message that segregates content between types of users fewer messages have to be created and sent, which may also save time.

Multiple communication paths/redundancy

There should be multiple means of delivering emergency information so that if one should fail, others may get through.

Also, according to the Partnership for Public Warning, research shows clearly that more than one channel of communication will be consulted by people at risk in order to confirm the need for action. The public expects to be contacted in a variety of ways. As evidenced by various historical and recent events, besides phone calls and emails, citizens also expect to be able to use and be reached via text messaging, and fax. In one exemplary incident, the 2012 Wisconsin Sikh temple shooting, barricaded victims relied on sending text messages for help, in addition to traditional phone calls. In addition, the public may look to social media as another vehicle to receive messages and check in on updates.

Additionally, the Partnership for Public Warning states, "A single warning is frequently insufficient to move people to action, especially if it cannot be confirmed by direct observation. For most people the first warning received captures their attention and triggers a search for corroboration, but cannot be relied on to elicit the desired behavior. Scientific research supports the common-sense observation that people are disinclined to risk being fooled by a single alarm that might prove false or accidental. Effective warning requires the coordinated use of multiple channels of communication."

Interoperability

To support these attributes, a "unified" emergency communication system should be able to connect to and communicate with other related systems, hence the term. According to the Partnership for Public Warning, a fundamental problem is the lack of technical and procedural interoperability among warning originators, system providers, delivery systems, and warning recipients. Originators of warnings must undertake expensive, redundant tasks using multiple, dissimilar tools and techniques to take full advantage of today's warning systems.

Also, there are multiple ways that an emergency communication system might obtain an original warning. One example of this might be the case of a building's fire control system dispatching a notice that a smoke detector has activated. A properly designed emergency communication system should be able to receive that notice and process it into a message that the building's occupants can understand and take action on in order to save life and property. Another example might be of the National Weather Service sending an EAS severe weather warning (e.g. via RSS feed or similar). In that case, the emergency communication system should be able to process and disseminate the warning in a similar way as the smoke detector example, and inform people of what actions to take.

The ability to interoperate should also consider the need to be both forward and backward compatible with older and yet-to-be-conceived technologies. Introduction of a system that cannot interoperate with previously deployed equipment create potentially serious barriers to effective operation.

Product versus service

An emergency communication system may be composed of a product and its associated hardware and software, as owned by the entity using it (e.g., an on-site paging network), or as a service owned and provided by a third-party (e.g., a cellular carrier's SMS network). Each have their own advantages and disadvantages; however, despite perception otherwise, services have some major inherent problems when it comes to effective emergency communications. For instance, using SMS as one example, due to the architecture of cellular networks, text messaging services would not be able to handle a large volume of communications in a short period of time, making this particular type of service a potentially ineffective emergency communication method.

Premises based versus non-premises based

Premises based emergency communication systems are those which primarily or wholly exist in the same geographical or structural area as it serves, while non-premises based emergency communication systems are those which exist in a different geographical or structural area. There are advantages and disadvantages of each. Often, non-premises based systems are slower than those that are premises-based, because at the very least, the different locations need to be connected via (usually public) data networks, which may be susceptible to disruption or delay.

Early systems

In America's formative years, common means of emergency communications may have mostly consisted of church bells being rung or messengers on horseback. Later, as technology developed, the telegraph became a nearly instant method of communicating. From there, radio communications, telephones and sirens became commonplace. After the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, by the Japanese in 1941, Civil Defense sirens became popular and resulted in their widespread use in military bases and towns across America. A particular weakness of these systems is that they largely lack the ability to inform people what they should do.

Fire alarm systems were first developed around the late 1800s and other related life-safety detectors associated with those systems (e.g., duct detectors, heat detectors, etc.)

were developed around the early 1900s. These constitute the first automated systems used in public and private buildings that are in normal and widespread use today. These systems, although originally designed for fire, have also been used for many other types of emergencies, sometimes effectively and sometimes not. For instance, if a fire alarm has been activated (as a general warning device) during an active shooter incident, the typical reaction to evacuate may not be the safest course of action; instead, a shelter in place action may be better. As an example, during the 201,2 Aurora shooting, amass shooting event that happened at the Century 16 movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, the assailant began targeting victims as they attempted to exit the theater; in which case, it would have been unwise to heed the fire alarm, that was sounding, and evacuate.

Modern systems

Today, modem communication tools such as smart-phones, flat-panel digital signage, GPS, and text-to-speech (among many others) are changing the way in which people are notified about emergencies. Of added value, with these more modem tools, is the ability to provide more specific instructions; so that, instead of merely notifying people about an emergency, it is now possible to provide specific instructions on what to do in order to mitigate the effects of an emergency. Furthermore, those instructions might even be customized for those peoples' specific and unique circumstances. For example, smart-phones may have geo-location abilities that would allow a map to be shown of safe locations (and perhaps routing there-to), relative to those devices specific users—all with a singular alert being sent as the source of those warnings.

Infrastructure-independent

Broadcast technologies that do not depend on man-made infrastructure to convey communication may be least susceptible to disruption during disasters and emergencies. Some examples of infrastructure-independent technologies are:

❖ Short-wave Radio

Short-wave (or Amateur) radio is a relatively long range method of communicating using radio waves. Because of the nature of radio wave propagation, communications made via short-wave radio can be intercepted and heard by anyone with the proper equipment and knowledge. However, due to their reliance only on electrical power (which can be obtained via batteries, solar, and other alternative means) and Earth's ionosphere, they are ideal for some of the worst case emergency scenarios. One disadvantage may be that one requires training and licensing to transmit using a short-wave radio, in many countries.

❖ Two-way Radio

Two-way radio consists of at least two devices (typically portable and hand-held) that are capable of transmitting and receiving communications to each other, using radio waves. Similar to short-wave, this type of communication is also able to be intercepted and heard by anyone with the proper equipment. However, unlike short-wave, this communication equipment is restricted by range (usually several miles, at most), but is relatively simple to operate and the main power source is usually provided by batteries. Two-way radios are in-use by many emergency responders on a daily basis, so they require minimal concentration to operate in the stress of an emergency situation, since the person operating it is already familiar with it. Additionally, many non-professionals may use unlicensed two-way radios, as is common with CB radio, Family Radio Service or PMR446.

❖ Weather Radio

A weather radio is a device which receives normal and emergency weather broadcasts. It may automatically turn on whenever an emergency is eminent or occurring, providing an alarm as well as a description of the situation. Anyone with a weather radio device can receive these broadcasts.

❖ Internet Based Communication

There is increasingly an opportunity to use infrastructure-independent network connection, sometimes called *Network-centric emergency notification,* for emergency communication. The emergence of initiatives such as Google's Project Loon offer opportunities for networked communication when infrastructure-dependent communication is hindered in emergency situations.

Each device has its own pros and cons given the emergency situation.

Limitations

Depending on the location, time, and nature of the emergency, a large variety of limitations could present themselves when it comes to communicating details of an emergency and any resultant actions that may need to be taken to protect life and property. For example, an audio public address system might be rendered ineffective if the emergency happens to be an explosive event which renders most or all of those affected deaf. Another common example might be the limitation of a fire alarm's siren component in a deaf school. Yet another example of a limitation could be the overloading of public services (such as cellular phone networks), resulting in the delay of vital SMS messages until they are too late. An effective emergency communication system should arguably be able to overcome as many of these potential limitations, as possible.

3.9 Rules for Successful Threat Intelligence Teams

Threat intelligence is quickly becoming a core element of risk management for many enterprises.

To truly understand risk, though, the enterprise must grasp and have the capability to handle emerging information security threats to its environment. Other areas of risk — financial risk, operational risk, geopolitical risk, risk of natural disasters — have been part of organizations' risk management plans since time immemorial; it's only these last few years that information security has bubbled to the top, and now companies are starting to put weight behind security threat intelligence programs.

Putting a team in place to manage threat intelligence, however, isn't as easy as other, more established areas of information security. First, it's newer, and second, organizations might not yet have the right skills and tools in-house.

With that in mind, we've identified four simple rules that will help organizations build and maintain a successful threat intelligence team.

(N.B. The rules are simple, but we do realize that implementation is not!)

Tailor Your Talent

It goes without saying that any team — threat intelligence or otherwise — is run by people, so hiring the right people with the right skills is critical. In some cases organizations can groom threat intelligence staff from within, from security operation center (SOC) teams to incident responders. Central skills like log management, networking expertise, and technical research (scouring through blogs, pastes, code, and forums) often come after years of professional information security experience.

Certain parts of threat analysis, however, necessitate distinct and practiced skill sets. Intelligence analysis, correlating and making predictions about threats based on (sometimes seemingly disparate) data, requires highly developed research and analytical skills and pattern recognition.

When building or adding to your threat intelligence team, especially concerning external hires, personalities matter.

Existing teams might feel threatened by new staff who appear to be "taking over" roles and responsibilities. Disgruntled employees are not productive employees. Thus, when forming or adding to the threat intelligence team, pay close attention to the "soft skills" of candidates.

Make sure that teammates can not only all "play nicely in the sandbox," but that you, as a manager, are communicating frequently, clearly, and honestly about expectations. The

interaction and workflow between teams should be pre-planned, and data sharing should facilitate easy integration for the teams responsible for making security verdicts.

Architect Your Infrastructure

Threat intelligence vendors provide strategic intelligence, but organizations should consider building in-house proprietary capabilities that deliver consistent, relevant, and actionable threat data.

Proprietary threat intelligence platforms (TIPs) have the advantage of being tailored to the organization's specific needs, and often come with a smaller price tag than commercial, off-the-shelf solutions. These custom-engineered solutions should integrate with external vendor systems to automatically collect, store, process, and correlate external data with internal telemetry such as security logs, DNS logs, Web proxy logs, Net-flow, and IDS/IPS.

Of course, building powerful proprietary capabilities requires an experienced data architect.

This individual is responsible for designing fast and nimble data structures with which external tools integrate seamlessly and bi-directionally. The data architect should understand not only the technical needs of the organization, but he or she should be involved in a continuous two-way feedback loop with the SOC, vulnerability management, incident response, project management, customer-facing fraud (where applicable), and red teams. This collaborative process facilitates control changes and allows the architect to deliver threat data in a format and on a timeline appropriate for each group.

Notably, threat analysts should never spend time manually processing operational data, and the architect fills that important role of providing the data upon which the analyst draws conclusions that ultimately decrease strategic business risk.

Enable Business Profitability

The goal of every threat intelligence program should be to find emerging threats before they impact the business. Reducing the number of direct threats drives down risk, which in turn increases profitability. Threat intelligence teams must therefore know what the business identifies as levers of profitability in order to prioritize the identification and dissection of threat events and sources.

At the center of profitability are the business's strategic assets (customers, employees, infrastructure, applications, vendors). Protecting strategic assets is priority number one, and defensive controls need to be managed as threats emerge.

To ensure protection for key assets, threat analysts must be able to examine the larger threat picture and identify such things as general industry threats, trends, attacker TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures), and commodity malware. While an attack on one industry organization, for instance, might not result in a direct threat to your own organization, knowing that several enterprises have been victims of a similar type of attack could indicate the need for hardened internal controls.

The ability to see the larger trends and drill down to direct threats against strategic assets means the threat intelligence team must understand what data it has available internally and what data it needs to source. Information gathering for an unknown purpose other than vague future applicability is a waste of resources, so set your sights on the information directly tied to the business and its levers of profitability.

Communicate Continuously

Enabling business profitability requires an understanding of the business's goals and roadmap.

To effectively set the roadmap, the executive layer also needs insight into current and future threats. If, for example, the business wants to acquire a partner but the partner is currently being targeted by hacktivist groups for what they deem unfair business practices, the executive team should have that intelligence before determining a market valuation and extending an offer. During a vendor evaluation, as another example, it is important to know if industry-specific malware, like Black Energy or Zeus, is emerging. Aligning one's business with a risky proposition is not a decision to be taken lightly.

Executives need to hear from the threat intelligence team how and why some of those threats translate to risk, and then learn if and how the risk of those threats can be mitigated. Organizational threats will always exist, and it's up to the business to decide its risk tolerance. Threat teams can aid the process by keeping executives informed but not spreading FUD (fear, uncertainty, and doubt). Delivering the message should be approached in a thoughtful, practical manner; do not overwhelm executives with technical details they neither care about nor understand. Their eyes are on the bottom line, and threat intelligence should be provided that supports moving in an upwards trajectory.

Conclusion

With these four pillars in mind, organizations can run an effective threat intelligence team which contributes to the success of the business. People and tools are important parts of the process, but equally important are cross-functional collaboration and communication.

3.10 Operating Skills for Dealing with Threats

❖ Introduction

❖ There can be different types of threats. Only a few are discussed in this chapter and those may be Threatening Telephone Calls , Bomb Threats etc.

❖ Threating Telephone Calls

❖ In most cases telephone calls are hoax calls but from the security point of view, such caiis should not be dismissed lightly.

❖ Irrespective of the nature of such calls, they should toe reported to the designated official.

❖ The designated official should intimate the Appropriate Authority so that the identity of the caller can be established.

❖ The contents of the call and all other details must be reported as accurately as possible so that those information and help in subsequent evaluation or the threat and correlated with incidental threats or related crimes.

❖ Efforts must be made to split the telephone call into bits such as—the point of threat—it is a family dispute, whether it is a personal matter, whether it is directed to an organization or group or class of people etc.

❖ Threating bomb Threats in a Building

❖ The Bomb threat can be to a Building .

❖ The Bomb threat can be in the form of a telephone call, or a written message, or a suspicious letter or a unclaimed package or parcel left behind in some premises of fne building

❖ There must be a designated official to act in case of such threats.s, decision must be taken promptly on issues such as - full or partial evacuation, search operations, intimation to respective authorities etc.

❖ Floor Wardens must be appointed who will ensure that, during evacuation, no one is left behind they must be trained to know what to look for during searches of the respective areas.The Floor Warden must quickly assess the type of each bomb and the threat they can pose.

❖ What to do during a bomb threat evacuation

❖ The building may have to be quickly searched before any evacuation

- A pre-notified Evacuation Signal may be announced to draw attention of inmates before evacuation
- A Evacuation route may be established and before that the area should be checked for any explosive device that may lie around
- The doors and windows are to be left open to aViow ventilation for possible fumes or gases after an explosion
- The iifts and elevators must be rendered un-operationai so that people do not get trapped.
- 'Ensure that orderly evacuation takes piace and people do not panic which moving away
- The sick, the disabled, the children, the femaies must be provided special assistance
- The Electric connection must be snapped and gas lines must be disconnected in order to eliminate possibility of fire hazard.
- The evacuated people must be sent at ieast 100 meters away in order to prevent injury from the impact *of the* blast due to flying glasses masonrv splinters etc.
- What to do after the evacuation
- A through search of the building should be conducted before aflowing peopie to re-enter. This should be done by a person from the Bomb Disposal Squad.
- In case a suspicious object is located, it must never be touched.
- Arrangements may be made to inspect the same by experienced personnel before the Bomb Disposal Squad finally arrives.
- During the search, oniy persons familiar with the area should be sent in.
- No object should be shaken or moved during the search
- If the intimated Bomb Threat gives out a possibi'e Time Target, the Bomb search operation should themselves evacuate 30 minutes before the given threat time and they should not resume search until 30 minutes after the specified time.
- What to look for during a search
- The threat call may specify the description of the threat and therefore the searchers must look for that type of object.
- Any object that is unusual for the area may be searched
- Any object which is of exceptional shape or size or which may emit some smeii or peculiar sound must be iocated.

- ❖ An object in which wires or batteries are noticed must be checked first
- ❖ Any object marked as ''Bomb'', "Fire'', "Danger" etc. must be checked seriously.
- ❖ Searches may be made for unidentified bags,, left behind baggages, boxes, luggage, iunch boxes, thermos bottles, wooden crates, furniture office equipments etc.
- ❖ False ceiis must be given special' attention as those are easy spots *for* planting rime bombs.
- ❖ Rest Room, Wash Rooms. Store Rooms, Computer Rooms etc. are aiso places for planting bombs and those must be searched thoroughly
- ❖ How to eliminate threat from a car or vehicle bomb
- ❖ If it is a parked vehicle, look for loose wires or unusual objects near it
- ❖ If it is an approaching vehicle, look around and underneath the vehicie before allowing it an entry
- ❖ If it is an unidentified vehicie, it must not be touched
- ❖ Go around the vehicie first, and then look under each wheel arch and the bumper to see if there are any unusual objects or loose wires
- ❖ The underside of the vehicle must be examined thoroughly with the help of an under-car search mirror
- ❖ While searching a car, ihe driver and front passenger area, the trunk/boot/luggaee area, the exhaust area and the fuel tank area should be carefully examined.
- ❖ During search at night, a battery torch should be.used.
- ❖ Before touching the vehicle, the search personnel must see if the windows or doors are broken or if there are visible scratch marks around the door locks or the trunk/boot/hood area.
- ❖ The search personnel must see if there are unusual ohjects/things inside the car/ vehicle or if the inside tapestry is tamper with.
- ❖ After opening the vehicle door, check that there are no wires are attached to the inside or the door
- ❖ inside objects must not be touched.
- ❖ hereafter, the Hood Bonnet and trunk/boot may be opened and checked to ensure that there are no wires attached or there are no unexpected components, boxes or unusuai wiring.

- ❖ Precaution guidance for handling threat calls.
- ❖ The call recipient must listen closely, remain calm and should never interrupt the carter.
- ❖ The exact time and duration of the call must be recorded.
- ❖ Record the exact words of the caller.
- ❖ Keep the suspicious caller talking by asking questions like -piease identify yourself, why are you calling me, what am I supposed to do etc. before recording the call.
- ❖ If the carter gives a bomb threat, ask the carter at what time the bomb is expected to explode.
- ❖ Asκ the caller the exact location of the planted bomb
- ❖ Ask the caller if be can tell about the kind of the bomb planted etc.
- ❖ After the conversation, the call recipient must write down the call report in details and immediate alert and intimate art concerned officials.